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Friday, January 20, 1882. 
LIEIJTEXM-T-GESECAL ARTHUIt J. HERBERT, C.B., Nembcr of 
Council, in the Chair. 
BRITISH 31ILZTARY POWER CONSIDERED TVITH 
REFERENCE TO WAR ABROAD. 
By Colonel H. B. H. BLUSDELL, Grenadier Guards. 
TIIE object of this lecture is to urge that the action of steam 
cruizers npon an encmy’s mcrcantilc marine in na-ial warfare has 
entirely changed the conditions of  great wars as they affect Great 
Britain. That, as a consequence, the idca which obtains of the 
military effort England would have to make in such. a war is inade- 
quate, and that an altcration in the cstablishment of regiments and 
changes in  the conditions of rescr-rc service are desirable. 
First, as to the resources of the British Isles : 
The popnlation is 35,000,000, concentrated npon a comparatirely 
small area, which is intersected by a most complete system of tele- 
graphs, railways, roads, and other communications. 
Tho wcalth and manufacturing po-ser-cspccially tho manufac- 
turing power of war malirieZ-of Great Britain is greater than that 
of any other nation, and her maritime preponderance as compared 
with any other Power is not only to be measured by the relatiro 
strcngth of their respective fleets, bnt t o  some extent by that of  their 
merchant navics. It is stated that 70 per cent. of thc sea trade, and 
tn-o-thirds of the stcam tonnage of the world, sails under the British 
fhg. The arrangements for manning the British Navy do not, 
however, appear satisfactory as contrasted with the obligatory enrol- 
ment for maritime service of their seafaring population by other 
Powers. 
Thus with a population whicli may almost be spoken of as ap- 
proacIiing that of France or Anstria, and 3s nearly double that of 
Prnssia in 1866, the great Znfent poKer of Englnnd is indispntablc, 
and so long as superiority a t  sea is maintained orer an enemy, t i m e  
is giocn to render that latent p o m r  active. For tinze all-important, 
Great Britain dcpcnds npon her WWQ-. 
The militay forccs which would be available immediateIy on the out- 
break of hostilities, although by no means despicable as against in- 
rasion bj- what mzy be tcrmcd coup de main, arc very small indecd as 
compared with the Zafenl resources of the country ; while the army 
aTailable for immediate action in an European Kar might cven be 
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DRITISII JIILITARY POWER COSSIDERED, ETC. 31 
regarded as insignificant, but for thc power of choosing and of 
cllanging 41ic line of its operations which the command of the sen, frc- 
qnentIg gives to a British force making war in a continent of 
peninsulas such as Europc is. This power largely increases i ts  
numerical cffect. 
In order to estimate thc war-effort ‘which thc British nation could 
in a contest of vital ixnportancc, it appears useless to refcr to  
wars in Western and Central Europe. 
Since tlic oecessities of Prussin, a t  thc beginning of tho century 
taught her to  train her men to  arms in relays, and to hold them ready 
to return to  thc ranks when summoned, and sincc an admirablc 
administrative sj-stem has enablcd hcr to  collect, organize, clothe, 
equip, feed, and m o w  the national forces so summoned, tho nations 
on bcr borders, nnless equally ready to place tlic bulk of their national 
forces on a war footing on thc outbreak of Iiostilities, have been liablc 
to be overrun, overpowered by superior numbcrs, and paralyzed beforc 
they could organize their forces. 
In  Central and Western Europe, then, Zafciit force, no matter how 
great, is useless to a nation, and the relative strength of .contiguous 
Continental Powers can only be contrasted by comparing their actual 
forces and their military systems. 
America is not, however, SQ circumstanced ; her isolated situation, 
likc the insular position of Great Britain, still gires her lime t o  
orpinizc her forces, and cnnbles her to dispense with the military 
systems of the Continent j while her systcm of Government, theoreti- 
cally as frec as that of England, is R guarantee ag-zzinst :I premature 
resort to compulsory service in the Army.’ 
A brief review of the war-effort made by thc Federal States during 
the American Civil War  probably shows what would happen herc 
were England engaged in a national struggle, morc correctly than thc 
rcricw of any othcr war or any speculation on the subject could do. 
On the Southern States taking up arms, and Fort Sumter capitu- 
lating, President Lincoln first called out 75,000 militiamen for thrcc 
months, nnless sooner clischarged, by requisition to  the States, for tlic 
proposed object of putting down thc rebellion. 
. It soon becamc evident that largc leries wcrc needed: Congress, 
meeting in  cstraordinary session, Toted 500,000 men and 500,000,000 
dollars. By thc end of thc Fear 1861, 600,000 men were under arms. 
Large armies were formed at  first by voluntary enlistment j when a 
sufficient number of rolunteers did not present themselres, each Statc 
was required to furnish i ts  quota, tho Gorcrnment giving a bounty. 
When thc quota was not forthcoming, men were drawn by lot.? 
During thc four years’ strogglc thc Northerners had called into thc 
field 2,039,748 men, of whom a million were under arms at  thc closc 
of the war. They had spent 1,000,000,0001. sterling, of 11-liich 
(iOO,OOO,OOO1. had been borrored by the Federal Government. When 
it is recalled that the debt contracted by Great Britain during tho 
I eny theoretieallj, bccausc tlic President, during tho Ciril War, assumed rery 
arbitrary power. 
* See JIoorc’s “Putnnm’s IIiotov,” rol. viii, p. 459. 
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32 BRITISH XILITART POKER COSSIDERED 
old Frcnch War from l i 9 3  iintil its closc amounted to 601,500,0001., 
the  enormous rate of expenditure in thc American TiTar is  rcalizcd.' 
The course of warlike effort mhich thc Northerners found them- 
selves compcllcd to make is cspeciallF notcworthy as showing that 
countries, thc fortunatc accident of whose position permits thcm to 
dispcnsc with oblifrntory service in pcncc timc, may, by a profuse 
expenditure, defer. thc resort to obligatory service in I-iar for a short 
time, bu t  if  tlie struggle in which they arc cngaged becomes protractcd 
arc compelled to resort to it. It mould appear, too, that  thc sooner 
a nation so situatcd, and viliich has become involred in a great war, 
realizes this fact, the better for its Exchcqucr. 
The American Civil War  introduced to no1,ice n new instrument of 
ocean Farfare-the stcam cruizer, and shoriecl thc dcrastnting cffect 
such ressels hnvc upon tho mercantilc mniiuc of an enemy, ercn though 
tha t  cncniy bc superior at sea. The shipping of the Federals, not- 
withstanding their superiority a t  sea, was reduced during the war by 
2,000,000 tons owing to thc depredations of the Confcdcrnte cruizers, 
and by the panic caused by them, which lcd to the transfer of 
shipping from the American to foreign flags, in order to aroid thc 
risk of captnrc. 
The war is also spccially notcKorthy as illustrating, by the small 
force of 75,000 men first estimnted as necessary to quell the rebellion 
I and the large numbers actnally used for thc purpose. how enormously 
a nation may, a t  the commenccment of a struggle, underrate thc effort 
required to bring i t  to  a successful issue; but how rapidly, the 
magnitudc of the effort required onec rcalized, it rises to the occasion. 
The population of the Federal States on the outbrcnk of ~ a r  was
10,614$85 freemen, 88,986 slaves, that  of tlic Confcderntes 7,570,224 
freemen, 3,8130,571 slares. The efforts made by tlic Confederates arc 
not  here touched upon. 
After considcring the warlike effort made by the E'orthcrn Americans 
in their civil war, as illustrating what n free country really can do in 
a national struggle, it is curious to read the idea which obtains of the 
military effort, Grcat Britain, with a population in the proportion of 
seven to four to that of the Federal States a t  the time rcfcrred to, might 
be cspcctcd to make i f  nnfortnnatcly she became inrolred in a grcat 
mar abroad (no argument is nccessary as to thc cffort which would bc 
made in the event of war within the United Kingdom). 
The "Times " of Worember 25th,1881, states:-"For a great crisis 
'' like the Russian War  or the Indian Mutiny ric must possess a large 
" rescrre of traincd men, so as to cnablc us to scndinto the ficld a t  
'' least two army corps, or an  aggregate of little less than 80,000 men," 
and  this statement may be said to take as large a view as lias yet 
appeared in the public press of the forcc Great Britain rrould bc 
likely to employ in a great n-ar abroad? 
" Statesman's Sear  l3ook " ; other authorities girc direct outlay G30,000,000?., 
but total cost 831,500,0001. 
A larger v i e r  wm taken in 1809, when ah. Windham stated t11at England 
could despatch 100,000 men nbroad (IIansard, rol. xii, KO. 1111.) Kinglake, 
rol. vi, p. 461, ~ta tc3  that Lor6 Lircrpool, tlic War Ninistcr, gnre the strength of 
. 
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33 
An article written by Sir Garnet IVolscIey in tho “Nineteenth 
t i  Century,” IIarch, 1881, states :-“ All serious thinkers upon our 
Army requirements, then, a t  last seemed to agree to the three 
~6 following postulates: 1st. That for the protection of these islands 
11 from invasion, for the defence of our foreign possessions, for the 
$6 rnnintenancc of our rule in India, and to enable us to fulfil our 
Treaty engagements in Europe, we might a t  any moment find it 
4~ necessary to put in the field an army of about 60,000 men, which 
~1 should hare behind it n thoroughly efficient mserve of \Tell-trained 
‘1 soldiers of a t  least cqnal numbers.” 
Now i t  is quite clear from what has been said on the subject of the 
b e r i c a n  War that such a force as is mentioned in the above quota- 
tions, and which fairly state the riew generally accepted, Iargc as 
compared with the force sent out by England to the Crimca, by no 
means represents the fighting power of a country of 35,00G,OOO of 
inhabitants, although i t  may be all that country can employ if it is 
rpstricted to certain self-imposed conditions for raising its forces. 
xor is the employment of larger forces limited by the inability to 
transport troops by sea, as is evidenced by the assistance rendered to 
the French and to the Turks in the timsport of their troops in 1855, 
when British shipping was far less thcn it now is. 
Usually in war the forces a country employs depend upon the 
forces of an enemyvihieh hare to be o-m-come and upon her omn 
reSOurCCS. 
In n war between European Powers the Tor& of St. Luke, 14 chap., 
31 and 32 vex-.-“ Or.what King, going to make war against another 
“ King, sittetli not domn first, and consultetli whether he be able with 
L L  ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty 
r‘ thousand ? Or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he  
“ sendcth an ambassage, and desireth conditions of peace ”-remain 
as true as when they mere written. 
TYlint, then, it may Be asked, is the explanation of the iden, mhielr 
obtains in England as to her probable action if involved in a great 
European war, for  it appears to be n conventional idea, based on 
circumstances no longer existing ? 
A n  examination of the conditions of war as they affected Great 
Britain a t  the time of the Peninsular War appears to furnish the 
explanation. After the battle of Tmfalgar, England had no rival in 
European \raters; she could cuter upon a war abroad or withdraw 
the Regular Infantry at  210,000, Caralry 2T,000, in that fcar; the strcngth of tho 
Artillery and Enginecrs mu not giwn, but tlint of the whole land scrrice, erelusirc 
of Scpojs, -as stated in Parliament to be 500,000. The forces rent abroad in that 
p r  wcre- 
RITII REFERESCE TO KAR Al3ROAD. 
Waleheren ......... about 40,000 
Sicilr .............. ,, 15,000 
Spain and PortugaI . . ,, 45,000 
Pinglakc remarks that the numbers of thc forces Eent abrond cannot bc relied or, 
as it is beliercd that some of the soldiers %ere transferred from one thcctre of war 
to another. Still, making ercry allomnce, the force Pent abroad mr;st hare been 
more tlian two nrmr corps. 
YOL. XXYI. D 
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34 DRITISII JIILITARS POKER COSSIDERED 
from it a t  will, and if sho withdrew from it, her cnemp’s power of 
injuring her beforc the days of stcam-power a t  seawas very limited. 
The despjtchcs of thc Duke of TVellington illustrate very forcibly 
the secondary light in  which forcign war was regarded in England at 
that timc; one political party assertcd that i t  would, i f  in  power, 
withdraw tho Army from Portugal, thc othcr was only prepared to 
keep i t  thcrc i f  the cost could be kept domn. The Dukc thought that 
as many troops as coiild be spared from other serckes should be uscd is 
the Peninsula; he went into calculations as to the relative cost of the 
Army at  .home and in the Peninsula, and urged thc Government t o  
keep thc Army in the Peninsula for fear of an attempted invasion of 
England a t  a futurc time, should thc French be relicved from the 
prcssurc of military operations on the.  Continent; but it is nccessary 
t o  quote tho despatches, as it is difficult to realize such a situation. 
To the Earl of Lirerpool. 
‘‘ My opinion has inrariably been, that it was tho interest of Great Britain to 
‘( employ in Portugal the largest army that could be spired from other serriccs ; 
‘ I  and thnt no more than 2,000 or 2,600 men ought to hare been stationed at  Cadiz, 
‘ I  which would not liarc cost a sbillingmorc than their pay. Tho expense at  Cadiz, 
‘ I  which I imaginc will amount to no trifle, out of the six or ninc millions, has been, 
“ i n  my opinion, entirely t h r o n  may,  equally with thc scrricc of the troops, 
‘; which would hare made a great diffcrencc here carly in the last summer. 
“ I n  respect to offcnsirc or defensirc operations here, if they arc le f t  to me, I 
‘ I  shill carry on either the one or tlic other, according to thc means in my porrer, 
‘ I  compared a t  thc timc with thosc of the enemy, and bcaring in mind always your 
‘ I  Lordship’s instructions of tlic 27th February, 1610, marked A. 
“I would recommend to Gorernmcnt to increase the forcc hcrc as much aa 
‘ I  possiblc,.putting d o n  the establi~liments clscwhere, snd of eoursc decreasing tlle 
‘ I  expense In thosc parts of thc Empirc from which they dnw thc troops. By this 
“ inensure thcyaill put it into thc p o w r  of tho Officer hcrc toarail himself of crcrr 
opportunity; thcy rrill bc surc of holding this country a3 long as thcy plen-~e; 
‘ I  and thcy will save the mholc expense of transports. 
I ‘  I shall bc sorry if Gorernmcnt should think themselres under thc necessity of 
“ mthdnwing from this country on nccount of the expense of thc contest. From 
“ ~rliat  I horc seen of the objects of the Frcnch Gorernment, and the eacrificcs they 
“ make to accomplish them, I hare no doubt that if the British Army wcrc for  any 
‘ I  rcnson to wi thdnr  from the Peninsula, and thc Frcnch Gorernment wcrc relicred 
‘I from tho pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all 
‘( risks to land an army in Hi3 Xajesty’s dominions. Then indeed rronld commence 
‘ I  an expensire contest ; then would Ei3 3hjcsty’s eubjects &scorer m h t  arc the 
‘ I  miseries of war, of which, by thc blessing of God, they Iim-c hithcrto had no 
‘‘ knodedgc; and the cultiration, thc beauty, and prosperity of the countrJ; and 
“ thc rirtuc and happines3 of its inhabitants, wouId bc destroFcd, whatcrcr might 
“ bc the result of the militav operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, 
“ much less an nctor in the sccnc; and I only hopc that the King’s Gorernmcnt 
‘ I  nil1 ccnsidcr rrcll what I hare abore stated to  our Lordship ; nilI ascertain aa 
‘ I  nearly as is in their poxer thc actual cxpenoc of employin$ D certain number of 
“ men in this country bcyond that of employing them a t  home or elscrrherc ; and 
‘‘ will keep up their forcc here on sucli D footing as will at a11 crcnts secure their 
“ possession without keeping the transports, if , i t  does not emblc their commander 
“ to takc ndrantagc of erents, and nssumc the cffensire.” 
“Sta. Narinha, 23rd March, 1811. 
And again he writcs- 
v 
“Fucnte GuinaIdo, August 29th. 
“We may spend ten millions o year in this country ; but it ia a rcry erroneous 
notion to suppo~e that dl that espensc i3 incurred by the war in thc PcninsuliL 
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KITE REFERESCE TO WAR AIlROAD. 
,‘ our establishments which TW harc herc mnld cost rcry nczr half that sum if 
L L  they KCrc kept n t  homc, and tho surpIus only should bo charged as the expense of 
I( I do not mean to  say that that expcnsc is not grcat, but it must bc 
borne as long as tho Spaniard3 nnd Portuycsc can hold out, or we must takc our 
Iearc of our character a8 a great country.” 
xo onc can read theso despatches without astonishment. I am 
of an expression used by a French master a t  a great public 
school, who cqmplained, when cxamincd beforc a Commission, of thc 
mxrLner in w h d  the study of foreign languages was slighted in the 
school course. Now, 
if sncll nu cspression can bc used with rcfcrcncc to so serious a sub- 
ject as a war, it mould appear to apply to thc manner in which the 
British nation treated their war in Portugal a t  the timc these 
despatches were written. 
ImngincVonXoltke, aftcr the Prussian Army N ~ S  already on foreivn 
soil in one of thp recent campaigns, haFing to plead as a reason ~ h y  It 
.;llould not be -iwthdra.m from the theatre of war that its cost mas not 
yery much more than If it was a t  home. 
But Great Britain could in those days, as a nation, sit at, homc a t  
case and xatch the small though heroic military force with which she 
took part in the Continental struggle, and it may almost bc said was 
a111c to limit thc immediate risk of w m  to such dimcnsions as she 
thought fit. 
In  the Crimein War, England had thc advantage of powerful allies, 
and mas thereby sared from the neccssity of employing large forces by 
land, whilc Russia had to fight a t  a point on her territory wherc it 
was most difficult for her to mustcr in strength. 31any will recall thc 
cspression, I‘ Bleeding the giant in the toe,” which vas applied to the 
Sebastopol campaign. Though steam was available a t  sea, the yozcer 
i t s  use coz?ferred on hostile cruizers had n o t  tlien been illzrstrated. 
Werc England 
inrolrcd in a European mar now she would i i~imedia~ely  fee l  t11e 
direct presstrre of war by the ntfacks of hostile steam cricizers on hcr 
mcrcantilc marine, and bc obliged to grapplc with her antagonist, and 
to esert her strength. 
Great Britain mould for thethbc obliged to organizc a gigantic sFstcm 
of ocean patrolling to protect her commerce from the attacks of hostilc 
stcam cruizcrs which, homrer  effective, would be enormously ex- 
pensive. Captain Colomb, in his ablo lecture on ‘‘ru’aval Intelligence 
‘‘ and Protection of Commerce in War,” espresscs most clearly thc 
dangers to British shipping, and I shall takc tho liberty of quoting 
his words. 
35 
Hc said it was treated as an ‘ I  objet dc lusc.” 
0. 
It is contended that thc case is very different no r .  
He states :- 
“Attacks on thc high seas mill bc madc b7 hostile craizers mhicli 
“ may elude the vigilancc of blockading fleets, or by vessels purchased, 
“ fitted out, and armed in rear of our fleets, perhaps thousands of miles 
I ‘  away from the blockaded coasts. It is to hc obscrved that, while 
“ thc cxtcnt of thc cnemfs seaboardlimits the operations of blockadc, 
the area of operations for thc direct protection of our commerce 
I ‘  b ~ ,  in a geographical sense, practicauy no limits at  all.” 
D 2  
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36 BRITISH JIILITART POIYER COSSIDERED 
And again- 
"It is the very first stage, rather than the closing sccnes of mari. 
1' time war, which dccides the fate of such trade. American war 
I *  fleets floated triumphant on thesea long after the American carrying 
' 6  trade-tcrrificd by  ocean fires kindled by an uncaught ' Alabama'- 
" had taken to  itself wings and fled. JloraI effect is thc grcat force 
'' to bc reckoned rnith in considering the protection of commerce. If 
" ihe first fern weeks of war shakes tha t  ignorance which blindly 
'' hopes that our nard  aimngcments for war are commensurate wit11 
'( our commercial necessitics, the British mercautilc marine wiII pro- 
bably disappear in a reaction of panic.:' 
The g c a t  raluc of the carrying trade of Great Britain I n s  bccn 
generally recognized in the discussion which has lately appeared in 
the  press upon imports anit erports. Captain Colomb cstimatcs the 
value of British trade at sen rcquiring protection in war a t  800,000,000~. 
a Fear, and for its protection he considers that six squadrons 
required in the Atlantic Ocean alone. 
Whatever system, however, v-crc to-be adopted for the protcction of 
the mercantile marine, it is abundantly clear that  the cost to the 
Gox-ernmcnt would be n r y  great, and the cosf to shipowners for the 
arming of their ressels, and probably a11 resscls would hare to be 
armed in some may, as me11 as for the payment of the Ligh rates of 
insurance, Rould also bc rery great. 
It is :~lso clear that  other P o w r s  are fully alive to  the effective us0 
which can be mado of the new ncapon in naval warfarc-thc steam 
cruizcr-as is evidcnccd by the formation of their roluntecr fleet by the 
Russians Then there was a probability of war bctn-ecn Russia and 
this country. 
Since this lectnre T T ~ S  Trrittcn Sir William Armstrong has given an 
a i ldrcs  upon tlic national defcnccs, in n-hich he expatiates upon the 
cficct of steam cruizers in futurc wars ; he spoke as folIows :- 
I' Light unarmonred ships, designed by Mr. George Rcndcl. had 
'' lately been built in this country for foreign Powxs, which, Kith R 
" displaccment of only 1,300 tons, had attained D specd of 16 knots a11 
" hour. They carried coal for stcaming 4,000 miles, and had already 
" actnally steamed 3,500 miles without replenishing. They were each 
" armed with two 10-inch new type guns, vhich had nearly an 
I' all-round fire, and were capable of picrcing 18 inches of iron 
*' armour, and with four 40-pounders on the broadsidcs. I t  was B 
" wry serious question what conld be done in the crent of a nnmbcr 
" of such rcssels as these being let  loose upon our commerce. At 
" prcscnt there p a s  not a single ship in the British Nary carrying an 
" armament competent to  'engage them, that could overtake them in 
'I pursuit, or evade their attack when prudence dictated n retreat. 
" Confidence m'ns often expressed in our mercantile marine being 
" capable of furnishing, on an emergency, B supply of resscls fit to be 
" converted into cruizers; bu t  where were there to be found among 
'' trading or passengers steamcrs rcssels possessing aspccd of 16 knots, 
'' with engines and boilers below water-level, and having an nnder- 
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KITH REFERENCE TO WAR ADROAD. 37 
Katcr deck to save them from sinking when penetrated by projcctilcs 
at or below the water-line ?” 
It is submitted, therefore, that  the days for England to  carry on a 
lsar with a small military force are past j that  the idea of doing 
Fo is a dangerous delusion calculated to cncourage the country to cntcr 
snch a war with a light heart, bat  without having determiued 
npon the vigorous action xhich will be neccssag. 
If England docs become involved in such a war, she will l ~ a r c  to  do 
llcr utmost both by land and sea to bring it to a speedy nnd successful 
conclusion. If this view is correct, it is unlikely that England could 
confine iicrself to  the holding of a small peninsula or  marine fortress 
el-pji in a war in which her interests were secomlary, but \ T o d d  be 
constrained to gra$ple mitli hcr ndrersary. 
T h e  is, however, one question outside the United Kingdom in  
wllich the interests of England are of pr imary  importance. Tlla 
maintenance of her communications with India i rould aI5vays be a 
matter of vital importance to England, in defence of which she would 
feel obliged t o  exert all her force. Differences of opinion there 
doubtless would be as to the circumstances which were to be regarded 
2s mcnacing the way to  Indiz, but for the maintenance of thc wny to  
India, whatever i t  might a t  the time be considered to be, Great 
Britain with 01’ without an ally would be obliged to -contend in 
earnest. 
I n  sucli a war it would be quite impossible to limit the forces 
employed to two army corps. Z%c force mxessnry f o r  the sersicc fo 
be pe~forineJ would haze t o  be w e d .  There would, doubtless, as 
there ivas in  America, be a period of hesitation, bnt, as there, a rcrul- 
sion of feeling ~ o u l d  take place, the country would see the absolute 
necessity for carrying on the war in an effective manner, and mould 
adopt whatever measurcs were necessary to  raise the force required. 
It may be well to recall what occurred i n  1878, when it  as thought 
necessary to oppose the occupation of Constantinoplc by the Russians, 
as illustrating the impossibility of attempting to limit the force to be 
employed to txo army corps. 
The Turkish forces, repulsed at nll points, m r c  retiring on the 
Gallipoli and Constantinoplc peninsulas. The great importance of 
holding these pcninsnlas was indisputable. 
Supposing two wmy corps had been sent out from this countrr in 
time to  take part in the defence of those peninsulas. Let 11s suppose 
that the regular regiments left a t  home were being raised as quickly 
as possible to P. war strength, and that a rcscrvc corps of some 
regiments in process of augmentation  as concentrated, and the 
militia called out, the strength of the Rcscrre Forces, militia, and 
volunteers, classed as cflicicnt, would hare amounted to 300,000. 
Behind the volunteers, ex-volunteers to  a numher equal to thoso 
serving might probably fairly be counted upon as available on an  
emergmy. 
IS it conceivable that with this large dofensire force at home, that 
no matter what the necessity for troops a t  the front, that  no more 
force would hare been sent out from England, bu t  that  all the regular 
Danger of an invasion tliere was none. 
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3s BRITISH JIILITART POTER COSSIDERED 
regiments when completed would have gone on quietly doing ~ O O S C -  
step a t  home ? 
It is contended, on the contrary, that besides officering and orgnniz. 
ing regiments of Turks a third army corps rrould have been sent out, 
no matter h o r  composed, as soon,as rcssels could bc got ready, as the 
rcserrc division ivas sent out in the Crimean War; that the scrrices 
of militis regiments volunteering would hare been accepted either 
directly for the Tar or to rcleasc regula? regiments, and that pro- 
tisionnl rolnnteer battalions would have been enlisted for the war on 
special conditions as rapidly as possible. 
It is contended, then, that though a \rell-grounded hope may be 
cntertaimd that Great Britain mill not become inyolred in a Tar with 
a Great Power, it is unreasonable any longer to assumc that, if slic 
docs become incolved in such a war, hostilities can, under any circum- 
stances, be carried on with small means. 
Fortunately, in the interests of pence, no foreign nation is likely to 
believe in tlic professed inability of Great Britain to put n larger forcc 
tlinn trno army coi-ps into the field. 
If it werc stated that owing to a difficnlty in getting men to train 
a t  Oxford tlic boat-race this Scar x-ould still take place, but that that  
Unirersity mould compete in a pair-oar, every expert would h o r n  that 
the idca was Quixotic. If a great athlete annonnced his intention of 
competing in n foot-race, but stated that he intended to confine him- 
self to hopping; or in a n-restling match, but to confine himself to 
the use of one arm, his opponents would smile, but rrould not relax 
their training preparations. 
A medical man sometimes is called in to sec a full-fed patient, ITLO 
says he is.nneqna1 to the slightest exertion, the least thing fatigues 
him, but after examining him his physician is able to say with con- 
fidence, “What you arc suffering from is ‘languor,’ not ‘mealiness’; 
‘( if your house were to catch fire sou mould soon find the full usc of 
‘’ your limbs.” 
So with England, a statesman of the calibre which it is thc fashion 
here to impntc to Continental statesmen xould not be misled as to tho 
forces which England said she intended to use. He would consider 
what such, a nation really could do, and assume that, the necessity 
arising, what the country could do, it xould do. 
What steps, then, it may be asked, can Great Britain tnke in peace- 
time to provide for the contingency of a great war ? The Army and 
militia reserves as a t  present organized can only be counted upon to 
complete corps to their war cstablishment, not to replacc casualties for 
any length of time> 
Hcr large latent military force, like that of America, can only bo 
gradually developed, and the only way in which prepaidon for its 
development can be mndc in pcacc-time is by the formation of il clear 
If txo army corps wen: sent out f i o q  thc country would practically bc f x c  to 
face with the question of mnnning the Army inirnedintely; if an d t m . y  m r e  sent 
out at any time, e w n  if the reserve hod reached its full ideal etrength of G0,OOO 
men, the country %odd equally bc face to  fnec with this question. 
See Appendix. 
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WITE REFERESCE TO WAR ABROAD. 39 
to the manner in which that dcvclopment can best be effected; 
for the Gorefnment is pomerless to takc any active measures in such 
probnblr the csperiencc of America Konld be found the best guide. 
First. To form provisional battalions in regimental districts of men 
To gire a specid rate of deferrcd ,pay to men actually in the field, 
Secondly. To require regimcntal districts to furnish a quota for 
their regiments or for general service, giving bounties and allowing 
substitutes,’ but requiring the individual to find his o r n  substitutc, 
be personally responsible for him in case of desertion ; the man so 
drafted might also be required to scrvc as an efficient volunteer 
hiniself ; the regimental districts would doubtless add to the bounties ; 
t k c  roluntnry system would thus be ased as long as possible. 
Finally. If neccssary, obligatory service, forbidding substitutes, 
would hare to be resorted to. 
The small actice force of Great Britain should, it is submitted, have 
the cstablishmcnt of all corps Gscd at a strength which would admit 
of their being nblo to take thc ficld a t  once in an efficicnt state on 
rcceiring a quota from tho reserve. At present this is far from being 
thc case: in thc infantry 43 battalions arc a t  a pcacc cstablishmcnt of 
480 rank and file, and 6 battalions a t  an establishment of 500; if these 
battalions irere suddenly raised to the war-strength of 1,000 rank and 
file, nearly two-thirds of the men composing thcm iyould be strangers ; 
the  battalions could not assimilate so large a contingent of strangers, 
and Set be regarded as fairly representative of their rcgiments.2 
It is urged that if  the strength of the weak battalions cannot be 
increased without reducing the strength of the battalions first for. 
serrice, it would be bcttcr even to do that, and, unless reservists can 
be cmployed i n  thcm, to reduce the war-strength of battalions for 
little wars. Ncre the number of battalions required to take part in a 
little Tar  consequcntly incrcascd, it T o d d  be preferable to continuing 
to keep a largc proportion of the regiments a t  cstablishmcnts from 
which they cannot, on receiving a quota of reservists, at once bo 
expnndcd to ,z war-strength, and rcgarded as efficient for immediate 
service. 
Then ns to the rescrrc : the ralue to a nation of a reserve of trained 
soldiers, who can bc recalled to the ranks on thr: outbrcak of mar, and 
enable that nation to take tho field n-ith D much larger force than it 
could otherwise do, is unquestionable, and a local connectionis a proper- 
complement of any system of expansion, as it supplies n bond of 
union which otherwise can only be obtained by long association, but it 
is urged that tho conditions of rcscrve serrice in this country are rery 
disadvantageous to the State. The soldier of the reserve is not liable 
It is nssumed that thcsc re,&$acnts, likc thoec sent to 2hhhnd  in 1Si9, would 
learc onc-fourth of their strength behind thcm, and of their strength going out, 
360 nnli and Gle would be their own men, and 610 rank and !30 would be Elrcingera 
until public ppinion is ripe for such action. 
to England it appears to bc- 
enlisted for the war on special conditions. 
pay to go to their next of kin if they fell. 
1 Sec Appendix C. 
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40 BRITISH JIILITARP POKER COSSIDERED 
to  bc called out for a littlc wr ,  consequently, when such n F a r  OCCU~S, 
thc regiments to bc sent out havc either to bc completed to a war 
establishment, by robbing other battalions at homc of men they can 
ill spnrc, as hithccrto, or must be kept up to a high establishment, as 
now intended, at the expense of the battalions last for service, and 
even so the small battalions will hare to supply men to  replace tliosc 
medically unfit as well as for special corps. In either case tllc regi- 
ments sent out arc deprived of the steadying cffcct of the older 
soldiers from thc reserve. 
One of the most serious iuconrcnicnccs of tho system of small 
cstablishmeuts, for which, so Em as I know, no remedy has bcen 
proposed, is that special corps in thc British Army are not self- 
supporting. On the outbreak of a little war mcn are required for 
thc Army Hospital Corps, Army Scrvicc Corps, and any other corps 
which may bc formed, bu t  as the men in thc reser-ic cannot be called 
upon, the only source from mhicli to draw thcm is tlic attenuated 
infantry regiments a t  homc, mhicli probably hnrc a very largc propor- 
tion of young soldiers. Imagine an OEccr commanding a regiment 
viith more than40 per ceiit. of his mcu under one year's scrricc-and I do 
not state an  imaginary percentage-in addition to the usual requisitions 
for drill instructors and cooks for militia, &c., being callcd upon to 
furnish volunteers of good or fair character, and somc service, to each 
of such special corps, and to send steady men to do thc duty of Army 
Hospital men gocc on serrice, afterwards receiriug an  order to for- 
ward thc names of fifteen men of fair character, trro pears' service, and 
unmarried, who arc milling to roluntccr to  such and such a regiment. 
Hc may also, with mhat, considering his field of choice, must appear to 
him a, delicate irony, be informed that considcrablc inconvcnicncc had 
been cspcrienced in consequence of men o€ indifferent character Iiaring 
been recommended for transfer, and that carc must he cserciscd in tho 
selection of men of really fair character from thosc volunteering.' 
By  a process of this sort, not only is a small battalion rendered 
mfit to  go on scrrice itself, \\-ere an  emergency to arise, but crcn 
ceases to  bc as efficient as it ought to be as a training school for 
recruits. 
Thc rcscrrc man n o r  gets Gd. a day, and is not liablc to be callccl 
out for little wars, c r c u  if sent to  the reserve premature17 a t  his own 
request : and assuming the rescrvc to  bc called out once in a genera- 
tion-thirty years-thc retaining fee paid for a rcscrrc man bj- tlic 
State amounts to 4312., without reckoning thc loss sustained by the 
State on mcn who do not appear, or thc cost of Staff.2 
Thc chances of a reserve man not being called out a t  all arc as fire to  
one, S O  that  really, when one thinks of tlic strain of a little war upon 
the Army vhilc the reserve man is looking on, his post seems to bc 
very much the sort of post the late Sam Weller, junior, prized,-"not 
" much to do and a good dcal to  gct." We temper the blade a t  great 
The French Iilrc.fcIt the eril effects of transferring men from corps to corps 
in their Tunis Campaign. 
2 Sec dppcndix 1). 
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WITH REFERESCE TO WAR ABROAD. 41 
kronblc and expense, and then put it on the shelf to rust, and use the 
jklf-tempered.' 
It Ollght to  be very ciearly stated that the conditions of rcserre 
ser.,+o have been enormous~y altered in farour of the soldier since 
file institution of the force; not only does tlie inan in the reserve get 
Gi. day instead of 4d., without any further obligation, but on 
tho reserre he is presented with his accumulated deferred 
pay with which he can purchase hi3 discharge, so t h t  110 qnau qieed 
2.enlaijt fit the s'eserce 2~110 does ?not tcisJi t o  do so. 
One can understand that i t  is desirable in order to encourage 
into the Army to make the exit as easy as possible, but i s  
deferred p y  enables any man who wishes it to take his discharge 
from the Service altogether, i t  is contended that if morc mcrc now 
from a reserve man it ought not prejudicially to affect re- 
cruiting. 
It is urged, then, tliat men of the Army Reserve should be liable to 
scrye in any little wars in which their regiments liarc a battalion 
engaged, and that to provide for the loss sustained by the reservc 
arising from discharges from that force by purchase, tlierc should 
direct enlistment permittcd into the reserve force to men who have 
serred not lcss than two or threc years in the Army, and have bee11 
discl~nrged with a fair character, and that men so enlisting should bc 
liable to general service in little ~rars ;  probably many men after 
purchasing their discharge from the reserve would also again enlist 
in it, were dircct enlistment into it permitted. Ex-qilitia reserve 
men and ex-roluntccrs of certain qualifications might with adrantage 
possibly be permitted to cnlist into the Army Eeserre, and there might 
be two rates of pay, 4d. i f  liable to serve only when there is an 
emergency, and G d .  if linblc to  serre any time when a little war occurred 
or was probable. 
When one considers horn incritably the establishments of corps arc 
affected by considerations of cost, it may not be out of place to remark 
that tho w d t h  of t h e  country has quadrupled since 1815, and thc  
population has nearly doubled, and that it behoves the Services always 
to urge that any comparison instituted between the cost of forces at 
t x o  periods should hare regard to  the population and mcalth of the 
country a t  each period. 
I n  order that erery Officer should feel the importance of effecting 
cconomies in matters not affecting efficiency in order to obtain as 
many men as possible for  the Army, it is urged that crcry Officer 
commanding a corps shouId report, for the information of the Gcncral 
Officcr commanding the district, upon any cconomies he thinks 
desintblc, but that  the General OUicer should only forviard any sug- 
gestion,in which he concurs.0 
lhcrc  seem3 no ralid reason d y  a rcserre man, who  ma^ bc regnrdcd a3 a 
man on continuous furlough, should not hare thc right to serrc on for pension if 
rcedlcd to tkc colours. 
? The system of public accounts, requiring all money roted in any one year to bc 
Spent in  that p r ,  militates against economy in engincer3' work. Tlierc i3 a 
natural anxiety to  spend all money roted instcad of swelling the Estimates of 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
or
th 
Ca
ro
lin
a C
ha
rlo
tte
] a
t 0
1:3
7 1
4 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
42 BRITISE BIILITARS POKER COXSIDERED 
The threc points I wish specially to urge, thcn, arc- 
1st. That therc should be a definite plan thought out how best to 
dcrelop thc latent force of the county. 
2nd. That all thc corps of the actirc Army should bc kept at  such 
cstablishments as admit of their immediate expansion to thc war- 
strength, aftcr recciring their quota of reservists, as efficient fighting 
bodies. 
3rd. That reservists should be held liablc to serve in m y  littlc wars 
in  which'their regiments may bc engaged, and that men mho havc 
serrcd a certain period in the Army. and havc been discharged with a 
fair character, should bc enlisted direct into thc reserve for genera1 
service in it. 
I must ask your indulgence for treating D Iargc subject in  so 
cursory a manner, my object being to draw attention to what appear 
to me gmrc though remediable defects in our system, Tiz., thc small- 
ness of thc cstablishment of a large number of bathlions and thc 
conditions of rescrrc service, and to clicit opinions from others better 
informed on tho subject than I am. 
I hare purposely avoided touching upon thc special requircmcnts of 
tho special arms, though I belicvc the numbers arc found scnnty in 
somc mountcd branches; upon thc assistancc which Great Britain might 
rcccirc from her external Empire, assistancc difEeult to measure But 
alrrays increasing; and I havc assumed supcriority a t  scn in the 
supposed contingencr so as to limit my subjcct. 
I ham also aroidcd all allusion to thc present statc of Ircland, as 
hitherto, in presence of an extcrnal foc, Ireland has been loyal, and 
bad as thc statc of things thcrc is n o r ,  TC may hopc that it is tcm- 
porav. 
nnothcr p r ,  Iicncc, swings on Ecniccs that m t l i  time might be profitably spent, are 
liable to be cxpcndcd too hastilyJ and for b u i l h g  purposcs a t  the r c ~  wont  timo 
of thcyxr .  
Pos:ibly some change in this system, as in that of small tmnsfers requiring 
'Ihcasury authorityJ might be cffected Bithout the sacrifice of a thorough l'arlia- 
mentary control. 
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officcrs. 
-- 
1,411 
43 
Non: 
commii 
and 
men. 
34593 
APPENDIX A. 
(Extract froin Arnay Reorganization Committee's Xeport, 4?1.) 
IST ARXT COUPS. 
S T A T E S S T  shoTing the estnblishmcnt of an armF corps for Eer-iice in the ficld, 
the strength of the 1st Army Corps (dcducting non-cff'ectivcs) according to 
the lntcst returns, tho numbcr required to complctc to  the War  Establishmcnt, 
2nd thc mcxsurcs proposed to sul;ply the dcficiencx4stinguishing tho sercrnl 
bnnchcs of tho Ser-iice, and the numbcr of OEcer~, non-commissioned ofiicers, 
and men, Officers' horscs, riding and draught horses, ficld guns, and carriages. 
ITorse Guards, T a r  Oflcc,  1st July, 1870. 
RECAPITVLAT~OX. 
Establishment of xn Army Corps for field\ 
Eerricc ................................................... J 
Strength Of the 1st Army corps (deducting 
non-effectires) ....................................... 3 
Eequircd to complete to war establishmcnt ..... 
n O W  TO BE SCPPLIED. 
Regimental ..... 
pmtmenkd .. 
By tnnsfcr from other corps ....................... 
Officers and Ofliccrs' chargers 
For regiments 
C n ~ d r y  and in- 
fantry drivers 
............ 'From Army Reserre 
co31b3Llnt3 .......................... 
Bitmen ................................ 
l F ~ ~ c ~ ~  Drirers b-c., for A m y  Selricc 
corps! ................................ 
Bearers for Army IIospita1 
To bc enlisted (drivers and Royal Engineer 
From General Post Office ............................. 
To be purched ......................................... 
1 corps ................................. 
..................................................... Tnin) 
To be supplied from storc or requisitioned ........ 
General totd..  ........... 
37,b13 
936 I 19,916 -- 
20,&52 
4i8 I 18,FS3 
-v- 
16,161 
267 
211 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
4 id  
- 
... 
... 
3,130 
F,918 
531 
2,653 
GO6 
1,153 
350 
169 
49 
... 
... 
.5.693 --
16,161 
1?,'537 
516 I 4,243 -
4 , i S I  
CG7 I i.111 
7,EOJ 
-
333 
328 
... 
... 
... 
667 
7, 
- 
2,3i8 
4,i63 
... 
7,141 
3 
Field 
gulls. 
- 
90 
- 
90 
- 
... 
... - ... 
- 
car- 
riages. 
- 
1,631 
- 
211 
- 
1,387 
- 
1,387 
1,397 
- 
1 N.D.--4fter completing the 1st Army Corps there will remain nrnihble 8,637 1st Class drmy 
Reserre, 20,562 Xilitin Reserre. 
C .  II. ELLICE, Adjutant-ffenerat. 
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44 BRITISH NILITART POWER COSSXUERED 
2SD ARXY CORPS. 
STATEXEST showing the establishment of an army corps for scrriec in the ficld, 
tbc strength of the 2nd Army Corps (deducting non-effcctires) according to tlic 
latest returns, the number required to complete to tlic War Establislimcnf, and 
thc measures proposed to supply tllc clclicicncy-distin,nuislling the scrcral 
b r a n c h  of tlic ScrTicC, and tllc nuniber of Officers, non-commissioned ofiiccrs, 
and men, Officcrs’ horses, riding and draught Iiorses, field guns, and carriages. 
Xorse Guards, T a r  Ofice, 1 s t  August, 1679. 
RECAPITULITIOS. 
h‘on- 
commis- otfcers. 
(private) 
Officers. :gt: liorses ru’lic horses. 
men. ---- 
1 , 1,414 1 35,593 1,213 11,334 _y__I L- 
37,013 12,597 
Establishment of rn Army Corps for field ................................................... serrice 
Strength of the 2nd Army Corps (deducting’ ......................................... 
1:equired to completeto ~ 3 r  cstnbliihiuent ...... 
I I O W  TO DE SCPPLIED. 
(Ilcgimentnl ...... 317 
OfEcers and Officers’ chargers 
By tnnrfcrfrom other corps .............................. 
For regiment3 ... 
Infmtrydrivers ... $From Army Ccserre ............ 
.............................. 
.................. 
................................. 
... 
............................................. 
......... 
-- 
froni General Post Office 
To be cnlihted (drirers nndRoyal EngineerTraio) 
To be purchased 
To be supplied from store or requisitioned 
Gcncrd ton1 ........................ 513 
?( 
L- 
... 
.-- 
3 2 5  
i,81? 
462 
i ,l45 
COG 
1,307 
330 
49 
525 
... 
... 
9,611 
1 
- 
337 
3G6 
... 
... 
... 
703 
536 
7,113 
... 
7,739 
- 
8,412 
- 
.I. 
... 
- 
1 K.l%.--After completing 1st and 2nd A m y  Corps rlrcrc nil1 remsin 3G3 1st Class Army Reserve, 
1?.@64 Jliiitis Eeserve. 
C. II. ELLICE, Adjutant-Geneiwl. 
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ITITII REFERENCE TO WAR ABROAD. 45 
ncd,lctions from the strength of the 1st Army Corps, as estimated in this lecture :- 
ror men found unfit thoilgh scrring .............. 4 per cent. 
nccruits and other casualtierr.. .................... G per cent.} 10 pcr cent.' 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 ;: :Z} 10 Per cent. Jibsentees of Army and Militis Rcscries ............ jrcn fotmd t l l l j i t  
l k n  scrring, 19,916, at 10 per cent. ...................... 1,990 
Rcecrres 12,335, ,, ...................... 1,233 
3,223 
- 
Similar dcductions from 2nd Army Corpi :- 
Men serring, 15,OSS, at 10 per ccnt. ...................... 1,595 
Rcscncs 16,712, ,, ...................... 1,671 
3,269 
Rcscrrcs remaining nfter frco army corpsformed :- 
Army Rceenc.. .................... 363 
Xilitin ........................ 12,OGL -
12,427' 
1,242 Deduct 10 per cent. ................ 
11,185 
Deduct men required to replace nb- 
scntcc3, kc., men medically unfit, 9;c. 6,493 
"$93 Remain arailablc as 
-
First Reinforcement 
at tlic date of return. 
Kow, in 18S2, thc, Army Reserrc is said to bc 25,000 as noainst 15,757, 
thc number of that forcc included in the rcturn. Thc&erensc, then, 
is 12,213 less 10 per ceut.=l0,992 men. 
Add iiicrcnsc to Army, lSSl 
Add Rcscrres arailnble a3 
First Reinforcement a t  
datcof return.. ........ 4,603 
1,351 
17*036 
Deduct Transfer3 no longcr 
required .............. 5,455 -
11,551 arailablc nor0 as First Rcinforce- 
mcnt. At the Crimean rate of aaste, G per ccnt. per menscm, 4,305 
men, this reinforcement aould Inst betmen tic0 and three monfhs. 
* A deduction of only 10 per cent. ne3umes the rcgimcuts first for scrsicc in a 
rcry sati.;factorJ.stnte; 9 25 per ccnt.had to bc deductcd, ns in the cascof regiments 
sent to Zululand in lSi9, there would hare been but 401 men arnilable for rein- 
forcement, 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
or
th 
Ca
ro
lin
a C
ha
rlo
tte
] a
t 0
1:3
7 1
4 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
46 DRITISII 3IILITARY POIYER COXSIDERED 
Lct 113 suppose, horrcrcr, that tlic Army Rcscnc na3 actually.. .. 
then deducting the  number .............................. C0,OOO ~15,767 
alrczdy accounted for in the rcturn, tIicrc remains .......... 41,213 -
or, deducting 10 pcr cent. ................................ 
Add increase to Army, 1651 .............................. 
Add First Reinforcement in return ........................ 
Amilablc as reinforecmcnts if trro army corps sent out and n 
33,798 
1,351 
4,693 -
rescrrc of G0,OOO.. .................................... 45,830 
Deduct transfers.. ...................................... 5,455 
Arailnblc as rcinforcemcnts ............ 40,351 -
Two arm7 corps 35,590 x 2=71,?95 non-commissioned officers and men. 
Supposing the naslc of the trro army corps to be at  the Crimean rate, gircn in thc 
report of Lord direj’s Committec as 58 per cent., or 6 per eent. per mensen= 
4,305 men per rnenscm, thcsc reinforcements would last nine months. 
If, howcrcr, 44,025 men is to be considercd a3 tlic maximum number to which 
the rcserre can attain 
45,026 
15,787 alrcndy nccountcd for in rcturn. Dcduct ........... 
25,235 
Dcduct 10 per ccnt. 3 2 3  
25,415 
Add.. ............ 
-
3,351 incrcasc to Army, 1651. 
4,693 rcmaining for Firat RcinforccmcnC 
at tlic time of thc rcturn. -
Arailablc ns reinforcemcnts ...... 31,469 
1 Lees transfers not rcquired .... 5,455 
25,S25 
-
At tho rate of waste abore calculated they nould fecd tho two army corps for  
ncnrly 8f.z months. 
* These transfers arc disastrous to thc Army, they would leave the rc$ments at  
home in a \-cry inefficient state. 
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APPEXDIX C.
On tlic f lor  of rccroits bciiik iusufficicnt, bountics xrould Iiarc to bc gircn, Then 
I~~~~ part should bc dcfcrred. 
~ l ~ c  limit to xliich boiintics should bc gircii bcforc resorting to obligatory y r i c c  
i3 all.importnnt to dctcrminc ; if too high they might dcmoralizc tlic Army. 
~ ~ n e r ; i l  Sherman, in  hi3 “ Ihnoirs,” pagc 337, adrocatcs high pay in prcfcrencc 
to bouutics. H c  also says the Unitcd States tried almost crery system 
I;,lo\c’n to modern nations, all with more or lcss SUCCCS~,  voluntary enlistments, tlic 
and bought substitutes, and that nU OEccrs of cxpcricucc will conhni his 
:l;jcrtion that tllc x ~ n  d i o  roluntarily enlisted at  thc outbrcak of tllc war xcrc the 
best, bcttcr than thc conscript, aud far bcttcr than thc bought substitntc. 
AP-PESDIS D.
d Pruesisn battalioil on a pctlcc cstablisliuxnt is not callcd upoii to fctd othcr 
corps, and on it3 expansion is fed by rcscrrists from it3 own nciglibourhood, wlio 
1l:irc probablj serrctl in its ranks ; the population in England is more urban and 
marc migratory, and though soiuc rcgiuiciits can dixn tlicir rccruits from tlicir o m  
sddis t r ic t  otlicrs cannot. The ratc of wage3 rarics so much that though crcry- 
thing is wisely dono to encourage tlic completion of rcgimcnts froni tlieir own sub- 
district, tlic r c d t  cannot be counted on, nor caii it  bc guarantccd that a nian will 
reside aftcr his scrricc wlicrc lie rcsidcd bcforc it. Bcsidcs, thc nicii in a I’russim 
rcgimcut are of all gradcs and all dcgrccs of cclacation, tlicrcforc, 3 monitorial 
intlucncc pcrradcs tlic mass ; in an EnglGli rcginieut, on tlic contrary, tlic nicn arc 
almost cxclirsidy drawl from thc wage-rccciring class ; tlicrcforc, tllc tiro cascs arc 
not absolutcly itlcntical, nud it niay bc that whilc cspansion is good for both 
scrricc3, i t  ought not to be pushed to tlic smic extent in the British Scrricc as i t  is 
in tlic l’rusaian. 
Gcncrnl UIGGISSOS, C.13. : 311 old association n i th  ColonclBlundcll, a3 IIC latcly 
bclongctl to thc Staff of tho district wliicli I hare thc honour to couimand, tempts 
1111: to alliidc to one point in his lccturc wliich kc and I Iiarc frcqucutiy discuss&, 
;itid wliicli I think ouglit to intcrcst ercrjone T F ~ O  eonsidcrs inilitary subjects, 
idlether I!e bc c id ian  or soldicr. I alludc to the dcfcrrcd pay, which is now 
supposced to bc so strong 3, tcmptatioil to recruit3 to enlist. 111 cspcricncc lcads mc 
to  doubt \c’liCtliCr dcfcrrcd pay ha3 produced tllc adrantagcs ~ l r i c h  thc country 
 as led to cxpcct. Tlicrc is O ~ C  point SO dangerous in it that I harc some licjitation 
i n  alliiding to it j a t  thc same tirue I tliiuk that wc ought not to scparatc xitliout 
bcing aware that  OIIC wllo liasa riglit to knot.;, is prcparcd to tisscrt that tlic dcfcrrcd 
pay of soldiers is what is rulgarly callcd “ dijcounted” prcriow to their dizchargc. 
‘I‘hat ulonc is n rcry ~crious clemcnt of dangcr. Tlic mcn borron- moncj, in short, 
upon n rerereion wllick is practically inalicnablc, that is to say, notlling bnt con+- 
tion for felony or dcxrtion can prcrcnt thc soldicr wlio 1m csmcd his dcfcrrcd pay 
froin obtaining it on his dischargc. It is not, thcrcforc,scry clifficult, if a man 
dcsircs to get amiy from hi3 rC$mCnt prcrious to hi0 propcr tcrm of scrricc, for liim 
t o  obtain throngli a moncy lcndcr sufficient moncj  to piirdiasc his frccclom. T11o 
~:iinc unccrtainty and, thcrcforc, dnngcr, partially appliC3 to his scrricc in tho 
rcscrrc ; and n-hen I tcll you that withiin the last n-cck, two of these rcscrrc men 
h a r c  applied to  inc, a3 commanding a district, onc eajiiig that he was in n statc of 
starration, and \roiild girc anjtbing in tho world to bc alloircd to rc-enlist, bccausc 
Iic codd not obtain cmploymerit, bciug knon-n to be a r c s r r c  mnn; and anotIrcr 
nritcs, ‘ I  May I emigrate, bccnwc three Eituntions n-hich I Law tried for I ham 
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54 BRITISII IIILITBRY POKER COXSIDERED 
(( bccn rcfuscd because I am n rcscrrc man? ” you will, I think, considcr that tlic 
rcscrrc principlc is not working so licalthily as many of us 1iarc bccn Icd to suppose. 
In soying this, God forbid that I ~ h o d d  say anything against the principle of the 
rcscrrc, but I think i t  ahodd be wcll considercd whcthcr thc enormous amount of 
money paid to  soldicrs cntering the rcscrrc as dcfcrrcd pay, produces all the adran- 
tagcs tliatwc arc led to espcct. 
Tlic CIIAIRMAS: A s  no one else riscs I must say a fcm words, though I am not 
inclincd to difirer from Colonel Bluudcll in any way. I Ic  has rather nndcrstatcd tlic 
ciifiiculties that  ~ ~ - o u l d  occur in sending two army c o r p  abroad. In 1877 and 1878 
the reserre was Icss numcrow and thcdifficulties grcater. Thougli thcrc arcmany who 
disapprorc of the short serricc systcm, that sp tcm has cnoblcdus to domore thanwo 
could crcr hare donc with long scrricc. Wc couldno\v, nitli the aid of thercscrre, 
without grcat difficultj,send trro corps d’arm6cs abroad and lcarc about 7,000 of the 
first rcscrre a t  homc. After sending eight battalions to the BIcditcrrancan to rclicro 
the eight battalions tabcn for tho first corps, thcrc would rcmain a t  liomc thirty- 
one battalions of wcak strength, mhicli would be filled up by the militis rcscrrc, 
learing the ’7,000 of thc first rcscrre to fill up the casualties which mould be caused, 
as Colonel Blundcll truly says, rcry quickly on senicc. When the Crimean Var 
commcnccd wc could not hare sent onc corps d’arni6c. I n  those days of boasted 
long scr&o what was tlic case? To despatch tltc small forcc first embarked i t  xas 
ncccssary to dram men from otlicr rcgimcnts. Voluntccrs wcrc called for in ordcr t o  
bring thc regiments up to Tar  strength. The 93rd, for instance, s e re  e d e d  upon 
to  roluntccr for the 4%d, and tlic 93rd wcrc scnt out ~hortly aftcrimrds, liaring to 
call for roluntccr~ from other corps. That has, unfortunatcly, bccn the sp tcm in 
our Army from tinic immemorial, and tltougli, perhaps, roluntccring of latc ha3 
occurred more frcqucntly ilian formcrly, it  was bccauae we wcre carrjing on two 
wars on a pcncc establishment. I entirely concur n i th  Colonel Blundell that i t  
would be most adrantagcous to h a w  two classcs of rcscrrcs-one arailablc for EmalI 
wars and the otlicr for European wars. I bclicre mysclf, aftcr an expcricncc of 
somc forty p r s  amongst soldicrs, that if thcrc wcrc diffcrcnt rates of pay for tllc 
ttro classcs ncarly crery man mould acccpt tlic highcr rate of pay. If  this pay was 
Gd. or 7d. for the first class, and only 4d. or 5d. for the second, lie ~ o u l d  elect to 
take tlic former, and we should then be abIc to fill up our rcgimcnts for small war3 
3s easily as possible, more espccklly, as you must rcmcmbcr, the cstablishmcnts of 
rc,&cnts arc now on quite n cliffcrcnt footing to what they werc formerly. WC 
hare now twclrc battalions in England at  950, a c  Imrc four battalions a t  G O ,  onc 
battalion a t  S O ,  and four at  630 j the remaining battalions arc a t  500 and 4SO. I 
T o d d  adrocatc also n cliangc many Officers will objcct to, that is, a reduction in  
the number of battalions. \Vhat is the use of those thirty-one battalions at homo 
which, as Colonel Blundell so lucidly cxplaincd,wodd be reduced to almost nothing 
by calling for roluntccrs for thc diffcrcnt corps abroad? Would it not be far better 
to hnre, fay, twcnty or twcntyfour battalions a t  homc 950 strong than to harc all 
these p a l t ~ l i t t l c  bottalions ? And, without conscription, the ballot, or somcthing of 
the sort, we shall find it difficult cnough to keep thc tn-o corps d’armCcs in the field 
efficient. If  the wliolc militia pcrc callcd out in England, which would be the casc 
during a p a t  European war, thcy would be quite sufficient for homc and colonial 
garrisons m t h  thc twenty-four or thirtj-four line battalions which would remain. 
I trust that thc Gorcrnmcnt nil1 considcr That Colonel Blundcll lias ruggcstcd 
with regard to the diffcrencc in the two classes of rcscrrc men. I must my I do 
not ngec m t h  General IIigginson in the rcinarlis he made just now about the  
dcfcrrcd pay not bcing popular or of any adrantage to thc men. And i d l i  regard 
t o  the desire of rcscrre men to come back to the Serricc to serrc for pension thcrc 
arc n great many fnllacics. I f  fou rcmcmbcr nhcn tlic mcn wcrc callcd out about 
four p r s  ago an offer ma3 made that any man who likcd might continue to s e r w  
with the colours. E o n  many do you think accepted the offer? Konc. Those are 
the nicn that you ECC mcntioncd in the pnpcrs as IuTinp bccn hardly trcatcd and 
ECRt nm3y to starrc. 1 am not stating what I do not know, but 1 am stating facts- 
thcrc was not a Eingle man nho acccptcd that offer. Again, only a p a r  or a p i -  
and D half ago the authorities tricd to obtain 1,000 u c n  from the rc: .crrc to come 
forn-ard Toluntarily. These are the men that thcy tell IOU cannot gct work and 
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"TITII RE%'ERESCE TO WAR ABROAD. 55 
,,+ill to rejoin rcginwnts. IIOT man 1 camc ? Thc numbcr has not bccn fillcd up. 
Tilcrcforc, I do not bclicrc all thc stories that arc told; but I do bclicrc that the 
n,en wo&l comc out manfidly on D grcat national cmcgcncF, and that if thc war 
was m-c Ellodd not liarc tho slightest difficulty in getting any number of 
men- \vith rcgard to what Coloncl Blundcll 113s mid as to thc incrcasc of wealth 
in t ~ 3  coiintry, it has no. b u b t  bccn immense, and x h j  ~hould not thc insurancc 
increase in thc E3nlC ratio ? I f  Trc hare property m-ortli millions morc tlian m-c 
pOs~C~scd gears ago, why Ehould statcsmcn grudge a fair proportionatc amount 
to profidc D thorong1ily efficient A r i q  as an insurancc for thc safctj and prosperity 
of thonation? \n l a t  i3  thc amount of tlicEstimatc3 in comparison withthcwcalthof 
Great Britain ? It may bc a large suni, but it  is nothing for such D nation as ours. I 
do not think that ColonclBlundcll ~vould find ninny coumancling Officcrs who would 
So far a3 I know economics arc not at all 
in thc d r m j ,  and I also know thc authoritics arc too much inchcd  to  
luake economics, and to reduce, without consulting commanding Officers, not only 
Tho men arc badly 
clothed, and they might bc far bcttcr clothcd a t  a rcrx triiling additional cxpcnsc. 
I will not troublc s o u  with a long spcccli, but I bcg to rcturn our sincerc thanks to 
Coloncl Blundell for thc \-cry intcrcsting lcctnrc hc has giren us. IIc has shorn  
11s tliat he has stuck1 thc Subject and thought orcr it deeply, and that there i3 5 
great deal to bc donc by Offiscrs in the way of bringing forward to thc notice of thc 
authoritics suggestiom which may hereafter be taken up. 
incluccd to suggest great economics. 
but also the clothing, which ought to bc improrcd. 
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